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Abstract. The subject of this paper is the relationship between marriage and
equality in Giambattista Vico. In his writings Vico gives the notion of marriage a
unique importance, not framed on any oversized notion of nature or natural law
but on the political fight for the right to marry (a quest for full citizenship status).
The right to marry is linked with complex dynamics of human equality, and to a
notion of human nature shaped by belief-dependent institutions.
1. The Philosopher of Marriage
Vico is an author whose writings seem to fascinate scholars of different
traditions and interests. There is no doubt that it is incautious to try to read
into his lines, in the haunting pages of his masterpiece, something that
cannot be explained by taking account of the articulate, rather complex
intellectual background from which his ideas took nourishment and vigor.1
In this paper such an incautious line of conduct will nevertheless be
undertaken.
The main topic of this paper will be the relationship between marriage
and equality in Vico. Marriage has become a philosophical issue again
(George and Elshtain 2006),2 and Vico is the philosopher of marriage.
1 Gustavo Costa, among others, wisely advises that trying to understand philosophers
without paying real attention to their historical background can lead to serious mistakes and
misunderstandings (“terribili cantonate”; Costa 1996, 170).
2 Conservative moral philosophy perceives the institution of marriage as jeopardized by
feminist and gay movements; they are particularly concerned because of the fight for a right
to marry for gay and lesbian people. Conservative authors do occasionally mention Vico; see
Timothy J. Dailey, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center for Marriage and Family Studies at Family
Research Council, The Slippery Slope of Same-Sex “Marriage,” http://www.frc.org/get.
cfm?i=bc04c02: “In his exhaustive examination of human history, Giovanni Battista Vico
(1668–1744), Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Naples, concluded that marriage
between a man and a woman is an essential characteristic of civilization, and as such is the
‘seedbed’ of society. Vico warned that chaos would ensue in the absence of strong
social norms encouraging marital faithfulness and the loving care of children born to the
union.” The same words are used by Pastor Steve King, Cherrydale Baptist Church,
Marriage—Why God’s Definition Matters (http://www.cherrydale.org/clientimages/30992/
pastorkingsbooklets/marriage-whygodsdefmatters.pdf). On law and the family in America
see Grossman and Friedman 2011.
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Needless to say, many authors have stressed the role of the family: It is
possible to trace the history of such an institution in Western political
philosophy all the way back to Aristotle, with his notion of oikos, and
beyond. However, Aristotle and many others do not speak extensively of
marriage per se, whereas Vico does.
Vico grants to the notion of marriage a significance that it does not have
in, say, Hegel (see, e.g., Vico 1990a, 422, 488, 542, 544, 564, 645, 648–9,
660–1, 689, 708, 741–3, 896–7, 962).3 Marriage is one of the three institutions
that mark the development of humanity out of the brutish state, together
with religion and burial: It is therefore at the root of the most important
development in the history of nations and mankind. The first human
institution was marriage, symbolized by the torch in the Frontispiece
Illustration; it was also “the world’s first form of friendship,” “the true
natural form of friendship” (Vico 1999, 237). The right to solemn nuptials
for plebeians is what is at stake in the other great change in such a history:
the end of the age of heroes, and the dawn of democracy and the age of
men. “[O]nce the human race had been firmly settled through solemnized
marriage, democracies arose, and much later monarchies” (ibid., 429).
Some of Vico’s most intriguing poems were written in order to celebrate
weddings, like the famous Giunone in danza: The Goddess is addressed as
the de le nozze riverito nume.
Moreover, marriage is defined as “a carnal union modestly consum-
mated in fear of some divinity.” It is the second principle of Vico’s New
Science, deriving from the first principle, which is divine providence itself.
Finally, marriage is also the school “in which we learn the rudiments of all
the great virtues” (ibid., 208, 212).
One of the reasons for Vico’s interest in marriage, however, is that
plebeians had to fight for the right to marry. The right to marry was linked
to their quest for full citizenship status: “Hence, when the patricians
granted solemnized marriage to the plebeians, they effectively granted
them the rights of citizenship as well” (ibid., 69).4 The right to marry is
notoriously at the core of the so-called “heroic contentions.”
In other words, to speak of marriage implies public acknowledgement of
a status, and of its political and legal consequences: Vico repeatedly stated
that what plebeians were fighting for was solemn nuptials. Hence, the right
to marry was linked to a full status among equal citizens.
3 That marriage is a key word/notion in Vico’s New Science can be easily proved on the basis
of sheer textual evidence. The notion of family is itself a cornerstone in Vico’s political
philosophy: marriage and family are obviously related, and yet distinguished (“marriage is
the seed-bed of the family, just as the family is the seed-bed of the commonwealth”: Vico 1999,
8). Promiscuity, homosexuality, and incest are severely condemned by Vico (see Zanetti 2011,
III).
4 See also, e.g., Vico 1999, 263: “Such was the primitive condition of the Roman plebeians
down to the age of their contention for solemnized marriage. [. . .] The plebeians’ demand was
thus a request for Roman citizenship, of which marriage was the natural principle”; ibid., 175.
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2. Two Notions of Equality
Here, a deceptively simple issue of equality is at stake. In a nutshell: When
plebeians realize that they are equal to patricians (are not all men created
equal?), they fight to have the same rights that patricians enjoy. Such a
train of thought is certainly important in New Science. It has to do with the
conceptual itinerary from basic equality to equality as a goal.5
Some years ago, Jeremy Waldron made a distinction between basic
equality, the notion according to which human beings are equal “in
some fundamental and compelling sense” and equality “as a policy aim.”
Waldron’s point is that we need a notion of basic equality to endorse our
egalitarian aims, and he stresses that while much has been written about
equality, modern literature deals far less with the background idea that
humans are fundamentally one another’s equals.6
While it is easy to read Vico solely along these lines, it is also possible
(or just interesting) to hazard another sort of interpretation, an incautious
one. There are hints, in Vico, of an alternative conceptual itinerary, from
equality as an aim to basic equality. This may sound counter-intuitive, but
since there is nothing mysterious in this approach, I wish to clarify it with
an example.
If I believe in the basic equality of all human beings, because God told
me to believe in it, I will probably be ready to fight for, say, the civil rights
of racial minorities. Blacks are equal to whites in a fundamental and
compelling sense (basic equality), and therefore (this is equality as an aim)
they should not be discriminated against by Jim Crow laws and the like.
Now, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that the average score of
blacks in admission tests for some Italian law schools is consistently lower
than that of white students. Here, possibly, we have a fundamental case in
which there is a difference after all. Let us suppose further that black
students adopted by richer white Italian families have scores as high as
those of white Italian students. The right kind of toys, entertainment, play
time, stimuli, the comfort of a beautiful home, the education that money
can provide, the security, the warmth of a safe neighborhood, can make a
difference to the growth and development of the human brain.7 Fighting
for equality, equality as an aim, taking steps so that there can be rich black
5 This line of reasoning is quite clear: “Roman history explicitly relates how, in their heroic
contentions with the nobility, the plebeians at Rome protested that the fathers chosen for the
senate by Romulus ‘had not descended from heaven,’ non esse coelo demissos. In other words,
the founders of the patriciate did not have the divine origin of which the patricians boasted.
[. . .] Reflecting on this equality, the plebeians began to seek equality with the patricians in
civil liberty, and eventually changed the Roman state from an aristocracy to a democracy.”
6 Waldron 2002, 1–3: “So the distinction between basic equality and equality as an aim is
fundamental to Dworkin’s work. Yet Dworkin has said next to nothing about the nature
and grounding of the principle of equal respect.”
7 On this subject, see Nisbett 2009.
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lawyers, rich black doctors, and so on, becomes a necessary step in order
to be able to achieve basic equality between groups. First comes equality
as a practice, i.e., egalitarian policies; the much vaunted basic equality, pace
Waldron, becomes the result, the outcome. Equality as a practice, the fight
for equality, is the prius; basic equality, the posterius. Once we have given
black families equal social status and economic power, they become equal
“in a fundamental and compelling sense.” It should be noted that there is
no logical contradiction between the two alternative conceptual itineraries.
It should also be noted that there are, however, interesting differences—for
example, it is much easier to defend affirmative action policies from the
latter point of view rather than from the former, which on the contrary
seems to imply a color-blind ideology.8
3. Humanity and Equality in New Science
There are important ways in which human beings can differ from one
another in New Science. It is not just minds and brains that are adaptable
in Vico: The whole human body is. The shape of the human body, its
natural strength and vigor, is not a prius, a given, a cause, it is a posterius,
a result, an effect (of “political” causes). Giants (the first brutish beings
who lived in the dark ages) were strong and disproportionate: Their very
body was different. The reason for the ugly shape and disproportionate
dimensions was first and foremost a civil reason:9 The lack of institutions
providing hygienic conditions and care exposed children to the well-
known effect of sali nitri.10 The less “city” we have, the more “forest” we
get, in which children have no option but to exercise their bodies the hard
way, struggling through dense woodland.11
8 Critical Race Theory authors have made an important contribution to a better understanding
of the relationship between equality and law. To translate into Italian, and to edit, some of the
key writings of the movement, was an exciting experience indeed: Kendall and Zanetti 2005.
On the absence of Critical Race Theory in Europe, see Moschel 2007.
9 “Human kind was at first divided into two kinds of people: the giants, or the pagans; and
the people of normal build, or the Jews. This must reflect the difference between the brutish
upbringing of the pagans and the human education of the Jews” (Vico 1999, 86). See also ibid.,
142 and 312, where the cleansing rituals, hygiene rules, have as a result the shrinking of the
bodies, the “reduction of the giants’ stature.” The physical change in the bodies is for Vico the
final outcome of a political triggering cause: “This is perhaps why the Latin adjective politus,
cleansed or neat, derives from Greek politeia, civil government.” See footnote 23 for another
example of “natural effects” explained with “political” causal factors in Vico.
10 It is the notorious explanation of the giants’ stature: of why “their flesh and bones must
have grown inordinately large.” In a nutshell, it is a problem of upbringing and education.
See Vico 1999, 140, for the details; see also ibid., 217: “For heroic education had begun in a
way to bring forth the form of the human soul, which had lain buried by matter in the giants’
huge bodies. And it likewise began to bring forth the form of the human body in its just
dimensions from the disproportionate bodies of the giants.”
11 On this intriguing theme, see Harrison 1992, pp. 3–13.
464 Gianfrancesco Zanetti
© 2011 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Ratio Juris, Vol. 24, No. 4
I think it is important to appreciate that Vico is ambivalent on this point.
On the one hand, humankind does exist.12 On the other hand, “human”
also means civilized, “human” also means “properly human,” and the first
dwellers in the brutish state are hardly so. Human nature is basically a
social nature, but the hunter-gatherers in the ancient forest were not social
at all; later Vico argues that it was important not to mix gli già venuti
all’umanità (those who had already achieved human status) with those who
had not yet reached that stage (Vico 1990a, 426).
Vico’s work includes both the notion of the unity of humankind and the
concept of other kinds of beings, quite different possibly down to the
structure and shape of their bodies, not to mention the ever possible
“return of a clear distinction between the heroic and the human” nature
(nature quasi diverse) in a further stage of the history of nations (Vico 1999,
465). When minds are at stake, the differences are so intense that civilized
humans cannot even imagine the feelings of the ancient brutes: “For to our
more civilized natures, the poetic nature of the first people is utterly
impossible to imagine, and can be understood only with the greatest
effort” (Vico 1999, 24).13
4. Inequality and Institutions
Another important difference is the difference, later in history, between
patricians and plebeians. On the one hand, they are in truth alike, and the
“fathers” could be seen simply as clever exploiters of their unfortunate
serfs. Once the serfs understand their true equality with the patricians, they
begin struggling, fighting for agrarian laws and the right to solemn
nuptials.14 Defiantly, they assert that the fathers had not fallen from the sky,
that patricians were not of divine origin. Yet things may be a trifle more
complex than this, and perhaps also more interesting.
It is not that the plebeians were simply perceived to be unequal, or that
a highly articulated series of lies had been put in place to cheat them into
submission: “Indeed, false religions were born of people’s own credulity,
rather than the impostures of others” (Vico 1999, 90). Religion and its
corollaries—the divine origins of the father-heroes, the secrets of auspices
and divination—were not simply convenient hoaxes perpetrated by a
12 For example, Vico mentions “questa gran città del gener umano,” “spezie umana” (Vico 1990a,
549, 859). God wants to prevent wars that “could eventually destroy the human race” (Vico
1999, 19). On the other hand, see ibid., 9, where Vico explains the origins of the expression
“human race”—it was about those, and only those, who had been humanely engendered in
fear of divinity, i.e., again, a notion dependent on civil institutions.
13 Here the ingentilimento (rise to gentility) seems to point to a radical change in human
nature.
14 “For once the plebeians perceive that they are equal in nature with the nobles, they
naturally cannot tolerate inequality in civil law, especially when they can obtain equality in
democracies or monarchies” (Vico 1999, 477).
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group of shrewd and ruthless patricians. Vico repeatedly stressed that
religion was the result of a very special process: a collective self-delusion
according to which groups of beings fingunt simulque credunt (ibid., 145),
they imagine things and then, by providential mistake, begin to believe
them all at the same time. Within this array of structured beliefs, patricians
and plebeians were unequal.
In the XLIII Axiom, or Degnità, Vico examined the origins of heroism
among the first people. While heroism was born “of the false opinion that
heroes were of divine origins,” it should also be acknowledged that the
“earliest myths must have contained civil truths” (Vico 1999, 91). This
double standard of truth fills the whole of New Science: “Livy makes
Romulus utter a shameless lie, which would have been a heroic truth if he
had applied it to these first founders of nations.” In a general way, “the
giants spoke truly when they uttered heroic sentences” (ibid., 225).
There are beliefs that enjoy a status quite unlike “physical” beliefs. If a
group of people believes that the sun revolves around the earth, they are
all wrong, those beliefs are wrong, and that collective belief is wrong. If a
group believes, say, that the meeting point is at the Berkeley Campanile, it
does not matter if according to other standards (e.g., a previously accepted
and voted rule) the meeting point is to be at Cody’s. The Berkeley
Campanile is truly the meeting point if everybody believes it. Institutional
facts are belief-dependent.15
Now, there is a point of view according to which the status of the
plebeians is belief-dependent: it is an institutional fact. In an important
way, one can claim that plebeians are different. The identity of Roman
citizens revolves around such a difference. As a Roman citizen, under those
institutional circumstances, a patrician is different from a plebeian. It is
almost another race, and if a free woman is pregnant by a serf, alitur
monstri alitur, something with two natures, a monster, a chimera is being
nurtured (ibid., 245 and see also, ibid., 163). This truth is, of course, of a
very special kind. Vico has a name for it: heroic truth.
5. Heroic Truths
Heroic truth does not mean “truth” that turns out to be convenient for the
heroes, the fathers, although it certainly does. Heroic truth does not mean
that it has to do with deeds of valor and of heroism, although it often does.
There are several layers of meaning in the notion of heroic truth (as is often
the case with Vico’s key concepts).
When, for example, Vico speaks of poetic truth, he tells us that Goffredo
(Goffredo di Buglione, leader of the Christian Army in Torquato Tasso’s
Gerusalemme liberata) acts as a real Captain does, in a truer way than any
15 On institutional facts, see at least Searle 1995 and Lagerspetz 1995.
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objective historical account of the deeds of any actual Captain. This truth
is linked with the delicate problem of universali fantastici.16
Vico also claims that the children of humanity, the heroes, never lie in
their legends. The ancient tales are always true: “They could invent
nothing false in their early myths”; “the giants spoke truly” with childlike
simplicity (Vico 1999, 166, 225).
Ancient tales and poems are always true because they “make” or
constitute the institutional reality they represent. Ancient tales are true
because they are (and are about) institutional facts that are belief-
dependent in a fundamental way. Their heroic truth is a poetic truth that
creates and makes an institutional reality within which patricians and
plebeians are truly different and unequal:17 “The plebeians were the ‘other
people,’ as Telemachus called them in a public assembly” (ibid., 297).
Roman Law itself was but a serioso poema, a solemn poem.
The fight for equality, a struggle that has to do with practical matters like
agrarian reform, debt laws, and so on, gives rise to the notion that perhaps
patricians and plebeians are not that different after all. In the new human
regime, as a matter of fact, they will be equal: they will be perceived as
equals, but they will also be equal within the constitutive set of identity-
shaping democratic institutions of the human age. The itinerary, here, is
precisely from equality as an aim to basic equality. The key passage is the
right to solemn nuptials: The institution of marriage is linked to a notion
of full citizenship that creates a basic equality of a new kind.
It should be noticed that when the issue of heroic truth is at stake, Vico
correctly stresses the role played by the senses and vivid imagination of
those passionate primitive men. I certainly agree: This is a key point (Costa
1996, 114). But I submit that yet another issue may be at stake here.
The heroic truth is also a collective truth. The vivid senses and intense
feelings of the men who created those heroic tales worked in a different
way than cold individual reason wielded by a member of the Repubblica
delle lettere. In refined civilizations where human reason reigns, individual
human beings are at work, writing poetry and criticizing laws in order to
make them more human. Reason dwells in individuals: members of the
16 On this subject, I found useful the lecture by Hayden White at the International Conference
Il sapere poetico e gli universali fantastici. La riflessione di Vico nella riflessione filosofica contempo-
ranea (Naples, May 23–25, 2002): L’errore creativo e la logica poetica: Vico e la produzione del genere
(White 2002). White correctly stresses that one of the lessons of Vico’s New Science is that what
is perceived as natural is often in fact quite artificial.
17 Axiom 47 (where Godfrey of Bouillon is mentioned) describes “the natural inclination of
the masses (volgo) to invent myths.” The earliest men, “as the children of the human race,
were unable to conceive rational categories of things, and thus felt a natural need to invent
poetic archetypes”—imaginative categories or universals. This means that “human race” as a
rational category could not be conceived; there was, on the other hand, the poetic truth of the
hero, of the true human being, which of course excluded many human beings from such
humanity. See Vico 1999, 93.
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academy, professors. Fantasia, on the other hand, seems to dwell in
groups—in individual human beings who are first and foremost members
of developing “nations.” It belongs to barbarians, whose reason is buried
in their senses, and who are therefore able to create, collectively as it were,
the great poems. There is, for example, a Homeric heroic truth, but then the
vero Homer is of course no individual human being endowed with
enhanced imagination, or strong senses.18 Old tales and legends are by
definition created by nations, i.e. groups or collectives. It is about imagi-
nation, granted; but it is a collective and shared imagination. It is not just
a matter of stronger senses, a point that Vico stresses time and again,
because it had been the great stumbling block on his way to the proper
understanding of antiquity. It is also a matter of collective, shared imagina-
tion: The statue of Homer in the Illustration does not honor an individual
philosopher, nor a single poet possessing powerful fantasia.
Individual truth can be keen; it can be learned, it can be erudite, but it
has no creative power. It does not constitute an institution in the same way
as collective beliefs do in heroic ages: It can, however, criticize them. Vico
“always had the greatest apprehension of being alone in wisdom; this kind
of solitude exposes one to the danger of becoming either a god or a fool”
(Vico 1990b, 80).
The heroic struggles between patricians and plebeians take shape against
the background of a heroic truth according to which the two groups belong
to different stocks, and should therefore not be mixed. Intercourse is
forbidden because the offspring would be at odds with themselves, hosting
in their bodies two very different natures.19 It is a right-to-marriage
problem: The point is that plebeians cannot celebrate solemn nuptials even
among themselves, and this is what Vico finds most crucial.20 They may not
marry (they have no right to marry) because they “cannot” marry, they are
not equal to the Fathers—the issue of basic equality comes to the fore again.
The nature of their intercourse, more ferarum, forbids such a marriage. To
let plebeians marry is to act against nature, i.e., against heroic nature. Later
in the course of history, more developed and intelligent minds were to
18 Individual poets, on the other hand, can be endowed with a barbarous nature, so that they
become “incapable of reflection [. . .] and therefore naturally truthful,” like Dante. See Vico
1999, 367.
19 Monsters were “the offspring of noble women conceived without nuptial solemnities.” “If
the patricians had shared nuptial rights with the plebeians, Livy says, any offspring would
have been born ‘at odds with itself,’ secum ipsa discors. By this, Livy clearly meant a ‘monster
with two natures,’ combining the heroic nature of the patricians, and the bestial nature of the
plebeians” (Vico 1999, 163, 245–6).
20 According to Vico, Livy had in mind the idea that patricians “could intermarry with
plebeians. But in their wretched condition of near-slavery, the plebeians could not have
demanded such a thing of the patricians. Rather, they asked for the right of contracting
solemn nuptials—this is the true meaning of connubium—which only patricians enjoyed”
(Vico 1999, 246). The plebeians “claimed not the right of intermarriage with the patricians, but
the right of contracting solemn nuptials, which belonged to the patricians” (ibid., 430).
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“strive to elaborate a jurisprudence based on natural equity, which makes
commoners and nobles equal in civil rights, as they are equal in human
nature” (Vico 1999, 476)—as opposed to heroic nature.21
6. Final Remarks
The traditional conceptual itinerary from basic equality to equality as an
aim (normative equality: equality as a practice, as an actual fight for
equality) was certainly at work. The serfs began to acknowledge that they
were not that different from the Fathers, and they used this notion as a
powerful argument to fight for their rights.22
However, the alternative conceptual itinerary was quite possibly also at
work in Vico: While fighting for equality, the plebeians gave shape to
another institutional reality within which they were basically equals.
Plebeians can realize that they are basically equal not by some theoretical
train of thought, or pondering some hidden philosophical truth which has
been skillfully kept secret by ruthless patricians; they can do so only while
struggling for concrete issues, fighting for an agrarian law, and finally for
the right to solemn nuptials.
They do not necessarily fight because they have suddenly understood
their basic equality; in Vico it is possible to read quite a different triggering
factor, which is coldly stated in the XCV Axiom: “At first, people desire to
throw off oppression and seek equality: witness the plebeians living in
aristocracies, which eventually become democracies” (Vico 1999, 94). This
desire has nothing to do with any notion of basic equality. It is a desire
rooted in basic human emotions, conceived as more than consistent with
human rationality in New Science. In democracies, the nature of human
beings has changed, because it is a nature created or “fatta” by human
beliefs, narratives, and institutions.23 Vico was a caring, loving father, and
a family man. Only from democracies on, however, (former) plebeians can
feel “affection for their own blood,” tenerezza del sangue. Before democra-
cies, in the heroic times, “plebeian mothers [. . .] must have hated rather
than loved children” (Vico 1999, 433–4). Vico does not link a mother’s love
to nature; nature itself, the “natural” feelings related to “the blood”
(sangue), is explained with an eye to civil and political factors.
21 As openly stated in the Section I of Book 4 (“The Course of Nations”) of New Science: “Three
Kinds of Human Nature.” See Vico 1999, 397–8.
22 “As many years passed and the human mind advanced, the plebeians eventually had
second thoughts about the vain claims of nobility. Realizing that they had a human nature
equal to that of the nobles, they resolved to enter the civil orders of the cities” (Vico 1999, 486).
23 Roman Emperors “felt themselves in the shadow of the patriciate’s splendour and therefore
devoted themselves to promoting the rights of human nature, which are common to both
plebeians and patricians” (Vico 1999, 434). The equality involved by a notion of human nature
common to all human beings (both patricians and plebeians), seems to rely on political, not
biological, “natural,” reasons.
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It is interesting that the philosopher of marriage, the one philosopher
who affirms so outstanding a role for the institution of marriage per se,
framed the problem of marriage not on any oversized notion of nature or
natural law, nor on blind respect for immemorial traditional mores, but on
the political fight for the right to marry. It is also interesting that he linked
the right to marry to the dynamics of human equality, and to a notion of
human nature shaped by belief-dependent institutions, which challenges
us to question, as Vico’s famuli did, any received “heroic” truth grounded
on inequality and discrimination.
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